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COMMENTS




Attempts to enact a net income tax in the State of Washington have
been numerous and unsuccessful.' Several statutes have been passed
which would have levied net income taxes on individuals, and several
other statutes have been passed which would have levied such taxes
on corporations. However, all these enactments have been held uncon-
stitutional, either under the United States Constitution or the Wash-
ington state constitution. As might be expected, there have been
attempts to amend the state constituion to make it permissible to
levy a net income tax. These attempts have all met with failure,
either in the legislature or at the hands of the voters when the amend-
ments went to them for approval. This Comment will analyze the
amendments that have been attempted and will then offer suggestions
of methods by which income taxation would be permitted. Complica-
tions caused by the federal Constitution will not be considered here.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
Article VII of the state constitution, as amended by the fourteenth
amendment,2 is the article under which the court has usually refused
in the past, and still refuses, to find a net income tax constitutional.
Its pertinent provisions read as follows:
The power of taxation shall never be suspended, surrendered or con-
tracted away. All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of prop-
erty within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and
shall be levied, and collected for public purposes only. The word
"property" as used herein shall mean and include everything, whether
tangible or intangible, subject to ownership. All real estate shall con-
stitute one class: . . . (Italics added.)
The parts of the amendment in italics are the provisions which have
1 For a more detailed history than will be presented in this comment, see Sly, Tax
Developments in Washington State-How We Got This Way, Washington State Re-
search Council Pocket Report Series 1 (1956) ; Lee, Tax Structure of the State of
Washington, 48 (State College of Washington Economic and Business Studies Bulletin
No. 14, 1950) ; and Tax Advisory Council of the State of Washington Report, p. 63
(1958).
2 Amendment XIV amended art. VII by striking all of §§ 1, 2, 3, and 4, and insert-
ing a new § 1. Laws 1929, c. 191, § 1, p. 499, approved November 1930. When refer-
ence is made to art. VII, § 1, it will be to the amended version unless the citation spe-
cifically states it is not.
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created the objections in the past. Since these provisions apply only
to property taxes, before a tax can be held unconstitutional under
these provisions it must be found to be a property tax.3
It is generally considered that there are three types of taxes: prop-
erty taxes, excise taxes, and poll taxes.' As there has been no conten-
tion in this state that a tax on income is a poll tax, it will be discussed
only briefly. A poll tax, or capitation tax, is levied on the taxpayer
simply because he is a human being subject to the jurisdiction of the
taxing power5 and is generally levied upon him without regard to his
property, employment, or occupation.6
There are very few Washington cases involving a poll tax.7 In
Thurston County v. Tenino Stone Quarries,8 the court upheld an
annual poll tax' of two dollars upon every male inhabitant of the
state between the ages of twenty-one and fifty years who lived out-
side the limits of an incorporated city or town. In upholding the tax,
the court said: "In the absence of any constitutional inhibition, it
must be conceded that the legislature may provide for the levy and
enforcement of a poll tax upon any or all of the citizens of the state,
regardless of the question of uniformity." '0 It also stated: "1
3 There is some question at the present time whether certain, if any, provisions of
the state constitution apply only to property taxes or whether they also apply to other
taxes. It has been stated in several cases, both before and after the adoption of amend.
XIV, that the only taxes mentioned in art. VII or elsewhere in the constitution are
property taxes and that, therefore, there are no constitutional limitations on excise
taxes in art. XII or elsewhere in the constitution. State v. Sheppard, 79 Wash. 328,
330, 140 Pac. 332 (1914) ; Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 33, 40, 51, 211
P.2d 651 (1949). This appears to be limited to art. VII by Standard Oil Co. v. Graves,
94 Wash. 291, 304, 162 Pac. 558 (1917), rev'd. on other grounds, 249 U.S. 389 (1919).
In the Gruen case, supra, at 52 and 53, it was held that the first sentence of art. VII,
§ 1, as amended, was not violated by the excise tax. From the above cases it is diffi-
cult to determine the exact extent of constitutional limitations on excise taxes.
In State ex rel. Collier v. Yelle, 9 Wn.2d 317, 329, 115 P.2d 373 (1941), the court
states that the parts of art. VII, § I, as amended, prohibiting the suspension, surrender,
or contracting away of the power of taxation and the requirement of a public purpose
for taxation, refer to all taxes. However, this point was suggested for argument by a
letter from the chief justice to both parties and was not argued but was assumed or
conceded in the briefs. (Briefs were found in File No. 6906 of, and through the cour-
tesy of, the Corporation Counsel's office of Seattle.) The court, in the Gruen case,
supra, at 33, said the above statement in the Collier case was dictum.
4 Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax, 17 MINe. L. Rav. 127 (1933).
Id. at 128.
85 C.J.S., Taxation, § 1068 (1954).
7The authors have found the following: State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77 Pac. 961
(1904); Thurston County v. Tenino Stone Quarries, 44 Wash. 351, 87 Pac. 634(1906) ; Tekoa v. Reilly, 47 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769 (1907) ; State ex rel. McMannis
v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 360, 159 Pac. 383 (1916) ; Nipges v. Thornton, 119 Wash.
464, 206 Pac. 17 (1922).
8 44 Wash. 351, 87 Pac. 634 (1906).
0 Laws 1905, c. 156, § 1, p. 297.
10 44 Wash. at 357.
11 Id. at 358.
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When the power of taxation is exercised considerations of public
policy must dominate; and the only rule of equality in respect to taxa-
tion is that the same means and methods shall be applied impartially to
all constituents of each class, so that the law shall act equally and uni-
formly upon all persons in similar circumstances. 8 Cyc. 1071.
(Emphasis added.)
In Tekoa v. Reillyi' the court held valid a poll tax on males between
the ages of twenty-one and fifty, excluding volunteer firemen." The
court recognized that a poll tax need not be uniform upon all persons
and held it permissible to exempt minors and women from such a tax,
saying: "It must be apparent that a poll tax imposed on minors and
females, without regard to property or ability to pay, would be unjust
and oppressive in the extreme." 4 (Emphasis added.)
A liberal interpretation of the language in the above two cases
would seem to make possible a poll tax upon the residents of the
state, with uniform rates upon all persons in similar circumstances
as determined by their ability to pay, in turn determined by their net
income. However, an income tax has been held not to be a poll tax
in other states. 5 Also, by analogy to Washington cases involving a
tax on the privilege of doing business measured by net income, it
would seem likely that the court would say the dominant measure of
tax was net income and the tax was, therefore, a property tax which
did not comply with the uniformity clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, irrespective of the language used by the legislature."8 And the
general definition of a poll tax' seems itself to preclude its being con-
strued as an income tax.
While a property tax is a tax assessed directly on all property of a
certain class within the jurisdiction of the taxing power and usually
imposed in proportion to value," an excise tax can be very broadly
defined as a charge imposed upon the performance of an act, the
enjoyment of a privilege, or the engaging in an occupation. It is also
held that "the obligation to pay an excise is based upon the voluntary
action of the person taxed in performing the act, enjoying the privi-
lege, or engaging in the occupation which is the subject of the excise,
1247 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769 (1907).
13 Laws 1905, c. 75, § 1, pp. 140-41.
14 47 Wash. at 209.
15 Brown, supra note 4, at 128, and cases cited therein.
16 See discussion under the head "Net Income Tax Statutes" infra.
17 A tax generally levied upon a person without regard to his property, employment,
or occupation.
Is 51 Am. JUR., Taxation § 29 (1944).
[WINTER
STATE INCOMAE TAXATION
and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand is lacking." 9
The Washington court, in Jensen v. Henneford,20 has said that
"when a tax is, in truth, levied for the exercise of a substantive privi-
leve granted or permitted by the state, the tax may be considered as
an excise tax and sustained as such." " (Emphasis added.) Relying
on this definition of an excise tax, the Washington court held invalid22
a Bellingham city ordinance 23 levying a tax on the "gross income,
revenues, receipts, and commissions, on all persons receiving com-
pensation for services performed within the city," 24 stating a munici-
pality has no power to control the right to work for wages and hence
no right to levy an excise tax upon such right.2  The court further
stated, "The right to earn a living by working for wages is not a 'sub-
stantive privilege granted or permitted by the state'" but is an inali-
enable right guaranteed all citizens by federal and state constitutions."
If the court adheres to this view, it would seem to preclude the pos-
sibility of levying an excise tax on the act of engaging in an occupa-
tion for wages. However, upon direct consideration of the question,
the court might accept the view of the United States Supreme Court,
in Chas. C. Steward Mack. Co. v. Davis,27 where Justice Cardozo,
speaking for the Court upon the power to levy an excise tax upon an
inalienable right, said:
We learn that employment for lawful gain is a "natural" or "inher-
ent" or "inalienable" right, and not a "privilege" at all. But natural
rights, so called, are as much subject to taxation as rights of less im-
portance. An excise is not limited to vocations or activities that may
be prohibited altogether. It is not limited to those that are the outcome
of a franchise. It extends to vocations or activities pursued as of com-
mon right.
An argument could be made for this view by virtue of the fact that
the Washington court has upheld a tax on the privilege of "using"
tangible personal property,28 which is an inherent right of property
"I' Id. at § 33 and cases cited.
21 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936).
'1 Id. at 218. Quoted with approval in Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 197,
235 P.2d 173 (1951).G2Cary v, Bellingham, 41 Wn.2d 468, 250 P.2d 114 (1952).
23 Ordinance No. 6784.
24 Ibid.
-2 Cary v. Bellingham, 41 Wn.2d 468, 472, 250 P.2d 114 (1952).
2 Ibid.
-7301 U.S. 548, 580 (1936).
28 Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1936) ; see Morrow
v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935).
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ownership. Whether such arguments would be successful is problem-
atical.
Attention now turns to the various tax statutes that have come
before the Washington court and the court's reasons for holding them
valid or invalid. First considered will be the statutes which would
have levied or imposed a net income tax."
NET INcoME TAx STATUTES
The first statute"0 which the court held to be a tax on net income
was passed in 1930 and was an attempt to impose a franchise privi-
lege tax, measured by net income, upon banks and financial corpora-
tions. Not graduated, it levied a flat five per cent tax on net income.
This tax was challenged in Aberdeen Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Chase'
and also in Burr, Conrad & Broom v. Chase." In holding the act
invalid, the court did not discuss the question of invalidity under the
Washington constitution but based its decision upon the equal pro-
tection clause of the United States Constitution.33 The court first
stated that net income was property 4 and then held that this act
was an attempt to establish a property tax (on the net income) and
not an excise or corporation franchise tax. The tax could not be
levied upon a certain class of corporations without being applied to
copartnerships or individuals engaged in the same business."
In 1931 the legislature enacted both personal and corporate net
income taxes, which were vetoed by the governor. However, both
29 Although levied as a tax on mining property, the tax (Laws 1921, c. 124, §§ 1-10,
pp. 401-06) held invalid in MacLaren v. Ferry County, 135 Wash. 517, 238 Pac. 579
(1925), was based upon the net profits of the mine. The tax was alleged to be "viola-
tive of §§ 1 and 2, of Art. VII of our state constitution [prior to the amend. XIV],
providing that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value in money and
requiring a uniform and equal rate of assessment to that end, in that: (1) It unjustly
discriminates in favor of mining property... (2) It does not provide a uniform and
equal rate of taxation according to value, even of such property as may be included
within the classification.... (3) It makes an arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust classi-
fication, depending upon source of title, not upon the nature of the property." The court
held "We are convinced that chapter 124, Laws of 1921, p. 401, is unconstitutional in
many, if not most of the particulars pointed out by the appellants...
30 Laws 1929, c. 151, §§ 1-40, pp. 380-98.
31 157 Wash. 351, 289 Pac. 536 (1930).
82 157 Wash. 393, 289 Pac. 551 (1930).
33 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV: "... nor shall any State deny to any person within its
jursidiction the equal protection of the laws."
34 157 Wash. at 361. It is interesting to note that when this decision came down,
amend. XIV was not in the Washington constitution, and there was no definition of
property in the constitution. Cf. notes 117 and 129 infra. But all the later cases which
have held net income is property under the amend. XIV have cited the Aberdeen case
as precedent for their holdings.
35 See denial of rehearing, 157 Wash. 391 (1930).
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taxes were approved by popular initiative in 1932.38 The act declared
the purpose was "to tax all annual income within the state as such,
and not as property"3 and the tax was to be "assessed ... and paid
annually . . . on all net income . . . by every person." 3S There were
graduated rates, increasing as the amount of taxable income increased.
This act was declared unconstitutional in Culliton v. Chase"9 on the
ground that it violated the fourteenth amendment of the state consti-
tution. The court held net income was property under the Wash-
ington constitution," no matter what the legislature designated it,
and therefore this was a property tax. The majority of the court
further held all income to be one class of property and graduation
of rates, therefore, violative of the uniformity clause. Judge Mitchell,
concurring, said that to classify property (net income) by size was
an unreasonable classification.41
The next attempt to enact a graduated net income tax was in 1935.Y'
The act read: "[A tax] shall be... paid.., by every resident.., for
the privilege of receiving income. . . ."" (Emphasis added.) Thus,
the act purported to tax "the privilege of receiving income" and not
the income itself. In this way the legislature hoped to avoid having
the court classify the tax as a property tax and, thus, to avoid applica-
tion to it of the uniformity clause of the state constitution. But the
court, in Jensen v. Henneford,'4 said: "[A]n examination of the vari-
ous provisions of the act shows clearly that the legislature was con-
cerned with the property [income] upon which the amount of the tax
was to be levied, not with the mere privilege of the individual to
receive the income." " The court then held the tax was in reality
upon the income (property) and the surtax was invalid, because it
was graduated, thus violating the uniformity clause. The normal tax
was held invalid on the same ground because of credits and exemp-
tions allowed, with the court stating: "In other words, 'net income,'
which, under the fourteenth amendment, constitutes one class of
a Init. 69, Laws 1933, c. 5, §§ 1-26, pp. 49-101. Approved by the voters 322,919 to
136,983.
37 Laws 1933, c. 5, § 1, p. 49.
* s Ibid.
zt 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933).40 Id. at 374.
41 Id. at 382. This is the only reason stated in any of the cases for holding that all
income is one class of property so that graduated rates are violative of the uniformity
clause.
42 Laws 1935, c. 178, §§ 1-72, pp. 660-704.43 Id. at § 2, p. 661.
44 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936).
45 Id. at 218.
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property, is reclassified or graduated by the act so as to constitute at
least two distinct classes, with the result that, as between the two, the
tax is disproportionate." 46
It was also decided in this case that a tax upon rents from real estate
is a tax upon the real estate itself and thus is a second tax upon such
real estate. As no such tax is levied upon unrented real estate or real
estate owned by nonresidents, a second class of real estate is created,
contrary to the fourteenth amendment, which states "all real estate
shall constitute one class." 47
Petroleum Nay. Co. v. Henneford,4s another 1935 case, held an
act,49 passed contemporaneously with the one in the Jensen case,
imposing an annual tax measured by net income upon all national
banks and all other corporations doing business in this state, to be in
violation of the uniformity clause of the fourteenth amendment. This
was because it was a property tax, and, as it was not also imposed
upon individuals and copartners, it could not be imposed upon cor-
porations. However, in the Jensen case, though a statute" imposing
a net income tax on individuals was held unconstitutional,5 the court
noted that the unconstitutionality was not because it did not also
apply to corporations, since it had to be read in pari materia with
another act providing for such a tax-the same act held invalid in the
Petroleum case for the reason it applied only to corporations.Y
The last attempt to impose a net income tax was made in a 1951
act" that provided:
Sec. 7... (a) ... Every bank and corporation... for the privilege
of exercising its corporate franchise ... shall annually pay... an excise
tax... measured by its net income equal to four per cent of such net
income ....
Sec. 38 .... (h) The amount of tax payable ... shall be reduced by
a credit equal to fifty per cent of the amount of the business and occupa-
tion tax paid.... (Emphasis added.)
46 Id. at 222. See note 41 supra. However, art. VII, § 1 permits classification of
personal property. Harsch and Shipman, The Constitutional Aspects of lVaslhigton's
Fiscal Crisis, 33 WASH. L. REv. 225, 248. Only real estate is required to be treated as
one class of property. Many cases support variations in rates, exemptions, and credits
under a straight "uniformity" requirement. See Harsch and Shipman, supra, at 253,
n. 7.47 WASH. CONsT. art. VII, § 1.
48185 Wash. 495, 55 P.2d 1056 (1936).
49 Laws 1935, c. 180, §§ 159-84, pp. 811-29.
50 See note 42 supra.
5144 Wash. at 217, 224.
52 However, this was after the other act was declared unconstitutional.
53 Laws 1951 Ex. Sess., c. 10, §§ 3-45, pp. 81-108 (1951).
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Although the act purported to be a privilege, or excise, tax and was
computed by a formula based on both net and gross income, the court
held" it to be a tax on the net income and a property tax which did
not comply with the uniformity clause of the state constitution,
because it was not imposed upon the property of individuals and
copartnerships. The court said" it was not an excise tax, as it had
no reference to income from the various business activities but taxed
almost any income from almost every source and was levied because
the corporation had net income, not because it did any business in
this state or exercised its corporate franchise.
Consideration will now be given to some tax statutes that have been
upheld as excises by the Washington court."
ExcIsEs UPHELD
A 1933 statute" imposing a tax measured by gross income for the
privilege of engaging in business in this state has been held" to be an
excise tax. In upholding the statute, the court said: "'
This act does not concern itself with income which has been acquired,
but only with the privilege of acquiring, and that the amount of the tax
is measured by the amount of the income in no way affects the purpose
of the act or the principle involved.
The court further said: Go
This being an excise tax, the legislature, under the 14th amendment to
our state constitution, has very broad power, and we cannot interfere
with that power except for arbitrary action, clear abuse, or construc-
tive fraud appearing on the face of the act or from facts of which we
may take judicial knowledge.
In 1935, in Morrow v. Henneford'" the court upheld a sales tax12
5 Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 196, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
" Ibid.
rO But see State ex rel Nettleton v. Case, 39 Wash. 177, 81 Pac. 554 (1905), where
the court held Laws 1903, c. 153, § 1, pp. 290-98, 293, invalid. This act prescribed a
scale of fees, based upon the valuation of the estate, to be paid to the clerk of the court
upon filing the first papers in probate. A graduate schedule of fees was provided with
increased amounts chargeable to estates of $1,000.00 or more (graduated rates). The
court states the statute exacted payments regulated by property valuations alone, and
that it was therefore a tax upon property. Although never overuled, later cases seem
to have reduced the force of this case, as many taxes now considered excise taxes are
regulated by property valuations alone.
57 Laws 1933, c. 191, §§ 1-31, pp. 869-97.
r, State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933) ; Supply Laundry
Co. v. Jensen, 178 Wash. 72, 34 P.2d 363 (1934).
"State ex rel Stiner v. Yelle, supra note 58, at 407.
oIbid.
6l 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935).
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levied against the purchaser of property at retail. The tax was added
to the purchase price of the article bought and was collected by the
seller for the state.
Also in 1935 the court upheld" another phase of the Revenue Act
of 1935,6" the so-called compensating tax. The act provides 5 that
there is "hereby levied . . .a tax or excise for the privilege of using
within this state an article of tangible personal property ... equal to
the purchase price paid by the taxpayer multiplied by the rate of
2%." 66 (Emphasis added.) In holding this not to be a property
tax, the court simply referred" to its decision in Morrow v. Henne-
ford,6" where it was held that the sales tax involved there was an
excise tax and not a property tax.
Another use tax69 was upheld as an excise in 1937. This imposed
an excise tax for the privilege of using any private motor vehicle. The
court stated:
That a tax upon the use of personal property is an excise, is no longer
open to question in this state. Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625,
47 P.2d 1016; Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49
P.2d 14; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 575 S.Ct. 524.
Being an excise tax, the tax is not objectionable upon the grounds
suggested.71 Unless the exaction is inherently oppressive, or the classi-
fication of the persons or objects affected is unreasonable, such a tax
is valid. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527,
518 S.Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464.
It can be seen from the court's language in the above cases that the
legislature has much greater power in classifying the subjects of taxa-
tion when an excise tax is involved than for a property tax.72 There-
fore, if the court should find that a tax on net income is an excise tax,
62 Laws 1935, c. 180, §§ 16-30, pp. 721-26.63 Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935).
64 Laws 1935, c. 180, §§ 31-35, pp. 726-28.
65 Id. at § 31, p. 726.
66 § 32 of the act exempts property already taxed under the sales tax portion of the
act or by another state by a tax equal to or in excess of that imposed by this act, prop-
erty brought into the state by a nonresident for his use while within the state, tangible
personal property purchased other than at retail, and property purchased during any
calendar month, the total purchase price of which is less than twenty dollars.
67Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 320, 49 P.2d 14 (1935).
6s 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935).
69 Laws 1937, c. 228, §§ 1-14, pp. 1167-72.
70 State ex. rel. Hansen v. Salter, 190 Wash. 703, 70 P2d 1056 (1937).
71 That it is a property tax and unconstitutional under the equal protection clause
of the U.S. Constitution and also under the uniformity clause of WASH. CoNsT. art.
VII, § 1.
72 Also see State v. Hart, 125 Wash. 520, 524, 217 Pac. 45 (1923) ; Texas Co. v.
Cohn, 8 Wn.2d 360, 386, 112 P.2d 522 (1941) ; Gruen v. State Tax Commission, 35
Wn.2d 1, 32, 211 P.2d 651 (1949).
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it should be possible to classify net income by size for the purpose
of applying different rates.73
A graduated tax on the privilege of inheriting property has been
upheld as an "impost or excise," as the charge is not on the property
itself but is on the state-granted privilege of succession to the owner-
ship and enjoyment of property.7' However, in the Culliton case7 1 the
court completely rejected any analogy between a graduated inheritance
tax and a graduated net income tax, saying that an inheritance tax
is not a tax at all but an impost laid only once, which merely decreases
the state-granted privilege to inherit property. This ignores the pre-
vious cases 6 where the court referred to it as an "impost or excise,"
using these words synonymously, and the general definition of an
impost as a tax, duty, or imposition.7
From the foregoing cases, it will be seen that the Washington court
has consistently held net income to be "property" as defined by the
Washington constitution, and the following types of statutes have
been held unconstitutional as property taxes not complying with the
uniformity clause of the fourteenth amendment to the state constitu-
tion: (1) a graduated net income tax levied directly on income, (2) a
graduated tax on the privilege of receiving income measured by net
income, (3) a flat tax upon the privilege of doing business as a
corporation measured by net income, and (4) a flat tax upon the privi-
lege of doing business as a corporation measured by a formula involv-
ing net income and gross income. In addition, a tax levied by a
municipality on the gross income of all persons receiving compensation
for services performed within the city has been held invalid.
The above cases on excise taxes show that the following types of
taxes are valid: (1) a tax on the privilege of doing business measured
by gross income, (2) a tax on the purchases of property at retail, and
(3) a tax on the use of tangible personal property within the state. A
7 See note 41 supra. Although there are no Washington cases on a graduated
excise tax, other states, which have no specific constitutional provision allowing an
income tax, have held income taxes to be excise taxes and graduated rates and exemp-
tions to be reasonable matters to be determined by the legislature. Featherstone v.
Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930) ; Green & Mfilam v. State Revenue Commis-
sion, 188 Ga. 442, 4 S.E.2d 144 (1939) ; Diefendorf v. Gollet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d 307
(1932) ; State ex ieL. Kux v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., 138 Mo. 70, 104 So. 689 (1925) ;
but see State cx rel. Nettleton v. Case, 39 Wash. 177, 81 Pac. 554 (1905) (Discussed
in note 56 supra.).
74 State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 71 Pac. 20 (1902) ; In re Sherwood's Estate, 122
Wash. 648, 211 Pac. 734 (1922) ; li re Ellis' Estate, 169 Wash. 581, 14 P.2d 37 (1932).
75 174 Wash. at 378.
76 See note 74 smpra.7 7 3BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) ; CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed.
1940) ; BALLE.NT NE, LAW DrcTcoNARy (1930) ; 42 CJ.S., Impost, p. 409 (1944).
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graduated tax on inheritance has also been held valid as an "impost
or excise."
The only sure way to validate a net income tax is to amend the
state constitution. This will be treated later in this Comment, but
two other possibilities that might make a net income tax possible
without amending the constitution will be discussed first. One possi-
bility is that the court might overrule its previous decisions, and the
other is a statute drafted to avoid the faults of previous enactments.
COULD A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BE AVOIDED?
There is always the possibility that the court may reverse a previ-
ous position." In Tekoa v. Reilly 9 the court overruled State v. Ide,,
stating its reluctance to overrule its own judgments to prevent a state
of uncertainty as to the law." But the court pointed out that there
is less reluctance where a rule of property is not involved, so that
titles have not been acquired in reliance upon it, and no vested rights
will be disturbed by any change. In holding that it had a duty to
inquire into the matter of whether its previous ruling should be over-
ruled, the court said: 2
No rule of property is involved, the legislature has reenacted the sec-
tion nullified in State v. Ide, with slight modifications, and if this court
has heretofore erroneously restricted the power of the legislature in
the important matter of taxation we deem it our highest duty to cor-
rest the error at the first opportunity.
This would seem to be the exact situation in the case of a net income
tax. No rule of property is involved, and the previous holdings of the
court restrict the power of the legislature in the important matter of
taxation.
Another pertinent case is State ex rel. Bloedel-Donovan Lumber
Mills v. Savidge 3 in which the court quoted" with approval the fol-
lowing from The Genesse Chief8 :
It is the decision in the case of the Thomas Jefferson which mainly
embarrasses the court in the present inquiry. We are sensible of the
78 There has always been a strong dissent in the cases invalidating income tax stat-
utes, with the court split six to three in all but the Culliton case, where the split was
five to four.
79 47 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769 (1907).
so 35 Wash. 576, 77 Pac. 961 (1904).
8147 Wash. at 204.
82 Id. at 205.
83 144 Wash. 302, 258 Pac. 1 (1927).
841d. at 310.
85 12 U.S. (How.) 443 (1851).
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great weight to which it is entitled. But at the same time we are con-
vinced that, if we follow it, we follow an erroneous decision into which
the court fell, when the great importance of the question as it now pre-
sents itself could not be foreseen; and the subject did not therefore
receive that deliberate consideration which at this time would have
been given to it by the eminent men who presided here when that case
was decided.
Although great attention has been given to the constitutionality of an
income tax in past cases, the importance of the matter ever increases
as the financial crisis of the state deepens, and the above case is
authority for further consideration of the problem.
Strong and recent authority for overruling previous decision is found
in the Windust case,"0 handed down in 1958. There the court directly
overruled several cases and said "the doctrine of stare decisis is not
applicable to a case of statutory interpretation .1'T This holding would
have direct applicability to a statute in which a tax was levied on a
privilege measured by net income. The court could reverse its pre-
vious decisions and say the tax was on the privilege and not on the
net income and, therefore, was not in violation of the uniformity
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Even though the court may not overrule its previous position, a
carefully worded statute can make it possible for the court to uphold
a tax on net income without reversing itself. The only way this can
be done is to make the tax an excise tax and not a property tax. The
court has already eliminated the possibility of an excise tax on the
privilege of receiving income,"8 and its holding in Cary v. Bellingham9
makes it doubtful whether a tax could be imposed upon the privilege
of working for wages. About the only indirect method of taxing net
income left is a tax on the privilege of using net income. This could
be done in one of two ways: either as a tax on the general use of net
income, similar to the present compensating tax,9" or a tax on a spe-
cific use of net income, such as the payment of the federal income tax.
A statute taxing the general use of net income could be worded
almost identically to the present use tax statute on tangible personal
property,"' with only a few changes to adapt it to net income." The
93 Windust v. Department of Labor and Industries, 152 Wash. Dec. 1, 323 P.2d 241
(1958).8
7Id. at 5.58 Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936).
89 41 Wn.2d 468, 250 P.2d 114 (1952).
'10 RCW 82.12.
0' Ibid.
02 The pertinent provisions of the present use tax statute read as follows:
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authority for such a tax would be the Washington cases93 upholding
the validity of the present use tax statute on tangible personal prop-
erty, while the authority against such a tax would be the cases 4 hold-
ing a privilege tax measured by net income unconstitutional as a tax
on property (net income).
Another type of use tax statute would tax a specific use of net
income, one suggestion" being that a tax be placed on the use of net
income to pay federal income tax. Such a tax would tax only this par-
ticular use, and yet in effect it would be a graduated net income tax."
The obstacle to such a tax would be the Washington court's expres-
sions to the effect"7 that an excise tax can be laid on only a substantive
privilege granted by the state, and the decisions of other courts9"
that the act on which an excise tax is levied must be a voluntary act,
whether the act be a privilege or a right. Authority which would
favor such a tax is quoted with approval in Morrow v. Henneford"9
and indicates that a tax imposed upon one of the numerous rights of
property would be upheld as an excise tax, while a tax upon the owner
merely because he is owner, regardless of the use or disposition made
of his property, would be a property tax."'0
Foim OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The only sure way of validating a net income tax is to amend the
state constitution. Such an amendment would require a two-thirds
vote of both houses of the legislature and a majority vote at the
RCW 82.12.020 Use tax imposed. There is hereby levied and there shall be
collected from every person in this state a tax or excise for the privilege of using
within this state as a consumer any article of tangible personal property purchased
at retail, or acquired by lease or by gift, or extracted or produced or manufactured
by the person so using the same: ...
RCW 82.12.010 Definitions. For the purpose of this chapter:
(2) "Use," "used," "using," or "put to use" shall have their ordinary meaning,
and shall mean the first act within this state by which the taxpayer takes or as-
sumes dominion or control over the article of tangible personal property (as a
consumer), and include installation, storage, withdrawal from storage, or any
other act preparatory to subsequent actual use or consumption within this state.
93 See discussion under the head "Excises Upheld" supra.
94 See discussion under the head "Net Income Tax Statutes" supra.
9
5 Tax Commission of the State of Washington, 1957 Tax Reference Manual 40
(1957).
96 Alaska now levies a net income tax equal to fourteen per cent of the amount pay-
able in federal income taxes. ALAs .A Comp. LAWS AxN. title 48, c. 10, § 5 (1949).
97 Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 218, 53 P.2d 607 (1936) ; Power, Inc. v.
Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 197, 235 P.2d 173 (1951) ; Cary v. Bellingham, 41 Wn.2d 468,
472, 250 P.2d 114 (1952).
98 51 Am. Jun., Taxation § 33 (1944).
99 182 Wash. 625, 630, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935).
100 For a discussion of other income taxes that might be upheld, i.e. a non-graduated
two per cent income tax or a gross income tax, see Harsch and Shipman, mipra note
46, at p. 279-82.
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polls. 1 ' Although there have been many such attempts over the past
thirty years, only four amendments have reached the voters for their
acceptance, and all four have been defeated.'Y2
A number of amendments to allow an income tax have been pro-
posed in the legislature. The proposals have taken two general ap-
proaches to the problem. One type adds new language which would
allow the tax without changing or deleting any of the existing con-
stitution.03 The other type has proposed more or less comprehensive
changes in, and possibly additions to, the existing constitution to
authorize the tax and make other desired reforms. 04 The many pro-
posed amendments introduced in the legislature"0 5 have met with
varying success there,' 0 though, as has been mentioned, none of the
four proposals submitted to the voters has been adopted. Some of
these proposed amendments"0 7 will be reviewed and an attempt will
1N AsH. Co NsT. art. XXIII, § 1.
102H.J. Res. 12, Ex. Sess. (1933). Vote for, 134,908; against, 176,154. S.J. Res.
amended 7 (1935). Vote for, 93,598; against, 328,675. S.J. Res. 5 (1937). Vote for,
141,375; against, 285,946. H.J. Res. amended 4 (1941). Vote for, 89,453; against,
176,332. The 1933 and 1935 amendments would have amended art. VII, § 1, and the
1935 amendment also would have amended art. VII, § 9 and repealed art. IX, § 12.
The attempted changes in art. VII, § 1, identical except for minor variations in word-
ing, would have left the first sentence unaltered, substituted "subjects" for "property"
in the second sentence, and changed the rest of the section to allow any tax exemptions
and graduated rates. The 1937 amendment would have added provisions which gave
the legislature power to enact a graduated net income tax and exempted any such tax
from the limitations on ad valorem property taxes. The 1941 proposal would have
added provisions which said "income shall not be construed as property and the legis-
lature shall have the power to lay and collect graduated net income taxes from what-
ever source derived, and provide exemptions, offsets and deductions."
103 As was proposed by H.J. Res. 17 (1957); 2, Ex. Sess. (1955); 13 and 32
(1955); 7, Ex. Sess. (1953); 14 (1953) ; 2, 2nd Ex. Sess. (1951); 9 (1951); 9
(1949) ; 15 (1947) ; amended 4 (1941) ; 5 (1937) ; 10 (1931) ; S.J. Res. 2 (1955) ; 20
(1953) ; 2, 2nd Ex. Sess. (1951) ; 20 (1949) ; 2 (1941) ; 14 (1939) ; 5 (1937); and
7 (1935).
1o0 As was proposed by H.J. Res. 9 (1955) ; 2 (1941) ; 12 (1939) ; 7 and 35 (1937);
2 and 19 (1935) ; 12, Ex. Sess. (1933) ; 11 and amended 11 (1933) ; 8 (1931); S.J.
Res. 1 and 17 (1935) ; and 3 (1931) (to change art. VII, § 1) ; H.J. Res. 9 (1929) ;
H.B. 163 (1927) ; and 190, Ex. Sess. (1925) (to drop old art. VII, §§ 1-4, and add new
§ 1) ; H.J. Res. 8 (1939) ; and S.J. Res. 10 (1939) (to drop art. XI, § 9, and all of
Art. VII and add four new sections) ; H.J. Res. Substitute 2 (1935) ; and S.J. Res.
amended 7 (1935) (to drop art. XI, § 12, and art. VII, §§ 1 and 9, and add two new
sections) ; House Bills 137 (1923) ; and 137 (1921) (to drop all art. VII and add four
new sections) ; H.J. Res. 21 (1953) (to drop all art. VII and add six new sections) ;
H.J. Res. 4 (1941) ; SJ. Res. 15 (1947) ; and 3 (1941) (to drop all art. VII and add
five sections) ; and H.J. Res. 10 (1929) (to drop old art. VII, §§ 1-4 and 7-9, and add
a new section).
'Or See notes 103 and 104 supra. H.J. Res. 1, Ex. Sess. (1950) ; 7, Ex. Sess. (1925);
and S.J. Res. 5, Fx. Sess. (1951), could not be found, but it is believed that they do
apply to income taxation. Some of the earlier proposed amendments may have been
missed in the search.
103 Only four passed both houses; see note 102 supra.
107 Proposas cited in notes 103 and 104 supra.
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be made to ascertain their effect, to the end that a satisfactory form
of amendment may be suggested.
First, consideration will be given seriatim to the elimination or
change of each of the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Elimi-
nation of the provision that "the power of taxation shall never be
suspended, surrendered or contracted away,"' 8 which probably ap-
plies to all taxes," 9 has been suggested."' This would have no direct
effect on income taxation, but, if income taxation were otherwise
achieved, it might cause any exemptions to be less strictly con-
strued" '1 and make exemptions for new industries more likely."'
Many of the proposals would have eliminated". the words "all
taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property .... ,114 Others
have proposed addition of a statement that "property" does not in-
clude income,"' or have inserted the word "subject" in place of the
word "property." I" The purpose of these proposals was substantially
108 Art. VII, § 1.
109 But see note 3 supra.
110 H.J. Res. 21 (1953), 8 (1931) ; and 10 (1929). Other closely related constitu-
tional provisions giving analogous protection art. I, § 8 (forbidding irrevocable
grants of privileges and immunities) ; art. I, § 12 (forbidding privileges or immunities
not belonging equally to all citizens or corporations) ; art. II, § 28 (5), (6), and (10)
(forbidding special laws relating to the assessing or collecting of taxes, granting of
corporate privileges, or releasing or extinguishing of any indebtedness or obligation
due the state by a person or corporation) ; and possibly art. XI, § 9 (forbidding the
release, discharge, or commutation from its proportionate share of state taxes of any
inhabitant of, or property in, a county).
111 51 Ai. Jum., Taxation, § 48 (1944).
112 As is done by some other states and Puerto Rico. See Miss. CONST. art. VII, §§
182 and 192.
"13 H.J. Res. 21 (1953) ; 4 (1941) ; 35 (1937) ; 19 (1933) ; 8 (1931) ; 10 (1929);
S.J. Res. 15 (1947) ; and 3 (1941).
114 Art. VII, § 1. As to the present effect of this provision, see Harsch and Shipman,
supra note 46, at 248, and more specifically in relation to income taxes, 252 and 280.
Related constitutional provisions are listed in note 110 supra. Also, art. VII, § 9,
requires local taxation to be uniform upon persons and property.
1"6 H.J. Res. 2 (1941), and S.J. Res. 17 (1935). S.J. Res. 3 (1931), would have
changed the uniformity clause to make it apply only to ad valorem taxes and then have
allowed income taxation to be in lieu of ad valorem property taxation. The effect of
this latter proposal is discussed in note 146 infra. (Cf. text relating to note 159 infra.)
116 H.J. Res. 8 (1939) ; Substitute 2 (1935) ; 12, Ex. Sess. (1933) ; 11 and amended
11 (1933); ll.B. 137 (1923); 137 (1921); S.J. Res. 10 (1939); and 1, and
amended 7 (1935). The two house bills would have left out of the uniformity clause
of art. 7, § 1, the requirement that property taxes are to be uniform "within the terri-
torial limits of the authority levying the tax." None of the states, which have neither
income taxes nor a specific constitutional grant of power to tax incomes, have a consti-
tutional requirement of uniformity of taxation on subjects. The following states with
the constitutional requirement of uniform taxation of subjects have an income tax even
though there is no specific grant in the constitution of power to tax incomes: DEL.
CON ST. art. VIII, § 1 ; GA. CoNsT. § 2-5403, Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153
S.E. 58 (1930), Green & Milam v. State Revenue Commission, 188 Ga. 442, 4 S.E.2d
144 (1939) ; IDAHo CoN sT. art. VII, § 5, Diefendorf v. Gollet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d
.307 (1932); MINN. CoisT. art. IX, § 1, Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N.AV.
102 (1934); N.M. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1. But see PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, Banger's
[WINTR
STATE INCOME TAXATION
the same. Each would eliminate the invalidity of an income tax be-
cause of graduation in rates,1 ' except as restricted by other general
constitutional provisions."' However, only the provision that "prop-
erty" does not include income would remove other property tax
restrictions."' Elimination of the uniformity clause would make the
phrase "all real estate shall constitute one class" (article VII, section
1) meaningless, while changing the uniformity clause to apply to
"subjects" instead of "property" would create a problem of interpret-
ing these clauses together. Therefore, it is recommended that if either
of these changes is made the clause concerning real estate be dropped.
Elimination.. of the provision that "all taxes . . . shall be levied,
and collected for public purposes only"'2 would have no effect on
income taxation. 2
Appeal, 109 Pa. 79 (1885) (held non-graduated income tax repugnant to this clause
but they do have local income taxation).
117 In the Culliton case
, 
174 Wash. at 376, the court, speaking of this "uniform on
subjects" and also "property shall be classified by law" provisions in the Idaho const.
supra note 116, stated, "that court held, as would we, under a similar constitutional pro-
vision, that the lawmaking power was absolutely free to define property to be taxed."
(Emphasis added.)
118 See notes 110 and 113 supra. Under these provisions the classification powers are
less restrictive. In the poll tax cases, discussed under the head "Constitutional Limita-
tions" supra, classification so as to tax only those best able to pay was held permissible.
In State ex rel. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Henneford, 3 Wn.2d 48, 99 P.2d 616 (1940),
where the contest was under art. I, § 12 (see note 110 supra), the classification based
solely on the size of the claim was upheld, when the need for protest, the statute of
limitation, and the administrative remedy available varied between two classes, those
with claims of over $200.00 for excess or erroneous tax payments and those with claims
of less than that amount. The broader power of classification should circumvent the
holding that income is one class of property, and that under art. VII, § 1, classification
of property on the basis of size alone is not reasonable as was done in the Culliton case,
see note 41 supra.
120 The other property restrictions that still apply are the exemptions listed in art.
VII, § 1, and the forty-mill limitations listed in art. VII, § 2. See Harsch and Shipman,
supra note 46, at 252 (on the property limitations) and 280 (on the forty-mill limita-
tion).
12U Proposed by H.J. Res. 21 (1953) ; 4 (1941) ; 35 (1937) ; 8 (1931) ; S.J. Res. 15
(1947) ; 3 (1941) ; and 17 (1935). H.B. 137 (1923) and 137 (1921), were proposals
made to amend original art. VII which did not include the "public purpose only" provi-
sion and they would not have added it.
121 Art. VII, § 1.
1 22 See note 3 supra, for the taxes covered by this provision. The same protection
may be provided by the opening sentence of art. I, § 16, as amended by amend. IX
("Private property shall not be taken for private use, . . ."), unless this provision
should be construed to apply solely to eminent domain. Also art. VII, § 5, states that
"No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law . . . ," and art. I, § 3, requires that
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The need for a public purpose for taxation was held to be required both by the
definition of taxation and by the requirements of WAsH. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, supra, and
the "due process clause" of U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV in State ex reL. Reclamation
Board v. Clausen, 110 Wash. 525, 531, 188 Pac. 538 (1920). See State ex reL. Hart v.
Clausen, 113 Wash. 570, 572, 574, 194 Pac. 793 (1921).
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The broad definition of "property"'23 was one of the bases of the
holding in the Culliton case'24 that income is property, the effect of
which is pointed out elsewhere. 2 ' The later cases on income tax were
based mainly upon this holding. But even if this definition were
eliminated, 2 ' the statements in cases 8 before enactment of the four-
teenth amendment could still be relied upon by the court in holding
net income to be property. However, the Culliton case indicates that
without the definition the court might be willing to reconsider these
earlier holdings.2 9
Deletion2 of the provision that "all real estate shall constitute one
class""'' would eliminate the objection of the Jensen case22 that
classification of real estate into income-producing and non-income-
producing is unconstitutional 33 but would not solve the other prob-
lems encountered.
The provision that the legislature may tax mines, mineral resources,
and reforestation lands by a yield tax, ad valorem tax, or both' could
be eliminated' without any direct effect on income taxation in gen-
eral."' If the uniformity and classification restrictions are removed
123 "The word 'property' as used herein shall mean and include everything, whether
tangible or intangible, subject to ownership." Art. VII, § 1.
124 See note 39 supra.
125 See note 3 supra; Harsch and Shipman, supra note 46, at 248, 252, 280.
128 See discussion under the head "Net Income Tax Statutes" supra.
127 This was proposed by HJ. Res. 21 (1953) ; 4 (1941) ; 8 (1939) ; 35 (1937) ; 2
and 19 (1935) ; 12, Ex. Sess. (1933) ; 11 and amended 11 (1933) ; 8 (1931) ; 9 and 10
(1929) ; H.B. 163 (1927) ; 190, Ex. Sess. (1925) ; 137 (1923) ; 137 (1921); SJ. Res.
15 (1947) ; 3 (1941) ; 10 (1939) ; 1, 7, and 17 (1935) ; and 3 (1931). The four house
bills were before the provision, see note 123 supra, was included in the constitution by
amend. XIV.
128 See notes 34 and 56 supra.
129 In the Culliton case, 174 Wash. at 374 (see discussion in textual referent to note
39 supra), the court stated that decisions from other states have no effect here on this
point because of "our peculiarly forceful constitutional definition." Without this provi-
sion outside decisions may be found to have more effect (see note 117 supra). On the
same page the court states the "overwhelming weight of authority" classifies income
as property. This statement is questioned by the editors in 97 A.L.R. 1488 (1935). The
cases on the point are nearly evenly split, but 27 Am. Jum, Income Taxes §§ 2 and 19
(1940) states the "prevailing view" classifies income as not being property. Cases are
listed in 11 A.L.R. 313 (1921) ; 70 A.L.R. 468 (1921) ; 97 A.L.R. 1488 (1935), and
supplements.
130 This was proposed in all proposals cited in note 127 supra, except S.J. Res. 3
(1931), and in addition HJ. Res. 9 (1955) and 12 (1939).
11 Art. VII, § 1.
132 185 Wash. at 222 (see textual referent to note 47 supra).
133 See 53-55 Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 320 (1954).
134 Art. VII, § 2. For the present effect see Harsch and Shipman, supra note 46,
at 248.
135 Proposed by proposals cited in notes 127 and 130 supra, with the addition of S.J.
Res. 3 (1931). For a discussion of the taxation of these properties without a specific
constitutional provision see 126 A.L.R. 1051 (1940).
136 However, it would make an income tax on these items subject to the general
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from the constitution, this provision would be surplus.
The remainder of article VII, section 1, lists four exemptions:87
property exempted by general laws,'88 property of the various gov-
ernmental units,"' credits secured by property actually taxed,""0 and
income tax restrictions. Cf. MacLaren v. Ferry County, 135 Wash. 517, 238 Pac. 579
(1925), discussed in note 29 supra.
1
3 7 As to their present effect see Harsch and Shipman, supra note 46, at 249-251.
138 This provision was in the original art. VII, § 2, before amend. XIV. Without
such a provision in the constitution, the power to grant exemptions would undoubtedly
be considered an inherent legislative power. The provision was not cited by the court
in the Jensen case, 185 Wash. at 222 (see textual referent to note 46 supra), when it
held that difference in exemptions for married and single individuals was an unconsti-
tutional classification of income. The requirement that general, rather than special,
laws be enacted when exemption from taxation is also provided by art. II, § 28 (5),
(6), and (10) (see note 110 supra). Cf. Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Ivarson, 19 Wn.2d
723, 729, 144 P.2d 258 (1943).
The proposals have included various provisions in relation to the power to exempt.
Removal of all constitutional restrictions on the taxing power obviates need for special
exemption provisions [H.J. Res. 8 (1931) ; and 10 (1929)]. Other proposals would
have had the constitution refer solely to income taxes, so that there would have been
no other specific constitutional reference to taxation. By specifically allowing income
tax exemptions, such proposals ran the risk of being construed as the only constitution-
ally allowed exemptions [H.J. Res. 21 (1953) ; 4 (1941) ; S.J. Res. 15 (1947) ; and 3
(1941)]. The power to exempt would have been limited to exemption of specific
groups, such as charitable, religious, or educational, by some proposals [H.J. Res. 12
(1937) ; H.B. 137 (1923) ; and 137 (1921)]. H.J. Res. 35 (1937), would have limited
exemptions to those which most fairly distributed the cost of government, which at
least would have been a good guide to the legislature when it considered various politi-
cal pressures.
138 This was not added by amend. XIV but was in the original art. VII, § 2. Its
elimination was proposed by H.J. Res. 21 (1953) ; 4 (1941) ; 8 (1939) ; 35 (1937) ;
substitute 2 and 19 (1935); 12, Ex. Sess. (1933); 11 and amended 11 (1933); 8(1931) ; 10 (1929) ; S.J. Res. 15 (1947) ; 3 (1941) ; and 10 (1939) ; and 1, amended 7,
and 17 (1935). H.J. Res. 10 (1931), and S.J. Res. 3 (1931), would have limited the
exemption to property held for governmental purposes.
If this provision were dropped, the legislature, by general laws, could adapt its tax
the present ideas concerning them. Any idea of protecting the United States Govern-
ment from state taxation was clearly gone with the adoption of amend. XIX (art. VII,
§ 3). Oppressive taxation of the state by itself does not seem likely. Detailed provisions
are made in art. XI as to the relation of state and local governments, and art. XI, § 12,
prohibits the state from taxing these local governments for local purposes.
140 This provision would either have been dropped (or not added by those proposals
before amend. XIV) by all of the proposed amendments that would have made any
changes in the existing constitution (see note 104, supra) except by H.J. Res. 9 (1955)
and 2 (1951). This provision may have some reference to the original art. VII, § 2,
which allowed a deduction of debts from credits. The 1957 Tax Reference Manual,
Tax Commission of the State of Washington (1957), states at 66 that the provision
was specifically designed to permit the classification of property. The present confu-
sion caused by this provision is outlined in Harsch and Shaman, supra note 46, at 249.
The writers recommend this provision either be dropped or a provision which more
clearly states its operation and effect be drafted and included in any constitutional
amendments. If this provision is not changed and other changes are made allowing an
income tax, then there is the possibility that the court could find that an income tax
which included income from such credits was in effect an unconstitutional tax on such
credits. That finding would be analogous to the holding in the Jensen case, 185 Wash.
at 222 (see textual referent to note 47 supra), that an income tax including rent is in
effect a tax on the real estate. This possible difficulty could also be avoided by a
specific provision that property tax limitations (see textual referent to note 159
infra) or credit exemptions do not apply to income taxation.
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$300.00 of personal property for the head of a family. 1' The first
and last are permissive, and the other two are mandatory in language.
As long as income is considered property for taxation purposes, they
are limitations on the imposition of such a tax.'
The proposed amendments have frequently contained provisions
that would restrict other forms of taxation,..3 allow coordination with
the federal income tax,' 44 grant to the legislature specific power to
classify certain types of property, 4 or allow the exemption from ad
141 The $300.00 personal property exemption seems to overlap the provision allowing
exemption by general laws. See Harsch and Shipman, supra note 46, at 251. If this
provision was intended as a limitation on the legislative exemption power, it was not
followed in RCVWr 84.36.110, which exempts all household goods, furnishings, and per-
sonal effects, as well as the $300.00 of personal property. The 1957 Tax Reference
manual, Tax Commission of the State of Washington (1957), states at 64 that its
present purpose has been taken over by the above statute. The provision was first intro-
duced into the constitution in 1900 by amend. III, and it must have had reference to
the property values of that era. It would have been eliminated by H.J. Res. 21 (1953) ;
8 (1939); 11 and 35 (1937); substitute 2 and 19 (1935); 12, Ex. Sess. (1933);
amended 11 (1933) ; 8 11931) ; 10 (1929) ; S.J. Res. 10 (1939) ; 1, amended 7, and 17
(1935) ; and 3 (1931). H.J. Res. 2 (1941), would have raised the limit to $500.00.
H.J. Res. 4 (1941), S.J. Res. 15 (1947), and 3 (1941) would have allowed raising of
the personal exemption without limit. A limit of $300.00 on only household goods and
furnishings was proposed in H.J. Res. 12 (1939).
142 See note 3 supra and its textual referent.
143 The restrictions that were proposed were: no tax on property [H.J. Res. 21, 2nd
Ex. Sess. (1953)], no business, occupation or gross income tax [H.J. Res. 17 (1957) ;
and 32 (1955)], no tax on the privilege of doing business [H.J. Res. 13 (1955)], no
tax on gross income [H.J. Res. amended 4 (1941)], no tax on gross income except
license fees [S.J. Res. 20 (1953)], no sales tax on food [H.J. Res. 17 (1957)1, and
sales tax limited to two or three per cent [H.J. Res. 13 (1955) ; 7, Ex. Sess. (1953) ;
14 (1935) ; S.J. Res. 20 (1953) ; and 2, 2nd Ex. Sess. (1951)]. These types of restric-
tions are not recommended, as they are apt, under changed circumstances, to cause a
recurrence of the same kinds of problems that are presently raised by the forty-mill
limitation or by the inability to tax net incomes. No comment is made as to the advisa-
bility of the requested tax reliefs, but it would seem much more advisable to have the
various groups of taxpayers address their requests to the legislature, rather than to
embody such relief in the constitution, so regular and comprehensive adjustments,
rather than sporadic and relatively unchangeable provisions, could be used.
144 A provision that "the legislature may or is authorized to coordinate the adminis-
tration and collection of state income taxes with the income tax laws and procedures
of the United States, and may delegate to such state administrators as it may designate
the authority to prescribe the means of coordination of states and United States tax
laws and methods for the allocation of income for taxing purposes" was proposed by
H.J. Res. 17 (1957) ; 13 (1955) ; 7, Ex. Sess. (1953) ; 14 and 21 (1953) ; 9 (1949) ;
and SJ. Res. 20 (1949). The provision would not have been mandatory on the legis-
lature; so it would not have required the coordination to which it referred. The power
was already in the legislature, with the possible exception of a greater ability to dele-
gate authority.
145 These proposals would have allowed the legislature specifically to classify cer-
tain types of property as follows: H.J. Res. 2 (1941) (real property, but all petroleum
products shall be one class). H.J. Res. 9 (1955) ; 4 (1941) ; S.J. Res. 15 (1947) ; 3
(1941) ; and 9 (1935) (real and personal property). H.J. Res. 17 (1953) (real estate
according to use). The problem of classification according to size being unreasonable
(see note 41 and its textual referent supra) and the other problems of an income tax
would not be met by these provisions, as the legislature already has the power to
classify unless it contravenes the real estate clause or makes an unreasonable classifica-
tion. H.J. Res. 2 (1935) which would have allowed the legislature to classify property
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valorem taxation so as to "otherwise tax.""' None of these proposals
would necessarily allow graduated net income taxation, and the future
trouble they might cause would seem to outweigh any advantage that
they might have. Three proposals would remove the present consti-
tutional obstacles to the taxation of income, grant special permission
to tax income, and include a reservation that there is to be no reduc-
tion of the retained powers of the legislature."" This is both an
awkward phrasing and a source of possible doubt as to the exact extent
of the retained power. With the removal of the constitutional obstacles
to an income tax, it would be best not to mention the income tax
specifically and thereby raise doubts as to whether it constitutionally
is to be the exclusive tax.
By far the most prevalent method 4 ' of providing for an income tax
in the proposed amendments is the insertion of a clause that specific-
ally allows a graduated net income tax. Two of these4 9 are coupled
with a provision that this is to be done notwithstanding anything else
in the constitution. As such an amendment would supersede other
provisions of the constitution anyway, this would seem to be sur-
plusage, except that it would emphasize the intent to make the specific
provision control. However, specific reference to the provisions which
are not to apply to income taxation would be preferable. But none
of the proposed amendments have done this.
In three of the proposals.. the grant of power is phrased in a nega-
tive fashion: "Nothing in this constitution shall be construed as pre-
venting the legislature from levying a graduated income tax." Although
this provision by itself would allow an income tax to be enacted, it
would still be possible for the court to find income is property, and
and levy graduated taxes on the classes of property would have come much closer to
solving the problems. This would have permitted a graduated income tax, but the
exemption restrictions and the forty-mill limitation problem would still have remained.
140 Proposed by H.J. Res. 10 (1931) and S.J. Res. 3 (1931). These provisions would
have created two problems: (1) when levying an income or other tax what types or
classes of property have to be exempted and (2) whether all property required to be
exempted has in fact been exempted when the attempt is made to levy other taxes
against it. S.J. Res. 3 (1953) would also have continued the present exemptions until
repealed, altered, or amended.
147 H.J. Res. 4 (1941) ; S.J. Res. 15 (1947) ; and 3 (1941).
14s The proposals are the same as in note 103 supra without HJ. Res. 13 (1955)
and adding H.J. Res. 15 (1947) ; 2 (1941) ; 8 and 12 (1939) ; 7 (1937) ; 12, Ex. Sess.
(1933) ; amended 11 (1933) ; H.B. 137 (1923) ; 137 (1921) ; S.J. Res. 3 (1941) ; 10
(1939) ; and 1 and 5 (1935). H.J. Res. 13 (1955) would have allowed a non-graduated
two per cent net income tax.40' H.J. Res. 2 and 32 (1955).
151 H.J. Res. 15 (1947) ; 7 (1937) ; and S.J. Res. 1 (1935). S.J. Res. 2 (1955) and
7 (1935) have both the negative and affirmative wording of the grant of power.
19581
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
therefore the limitations on the taxing of property, other than the
graduation feature, would still apply.1"'
Several proposed amendments" 2 have specifically empowered the
legislature to grant exemptions and deductions from income taxa-
tion. It would be desirable to include a clause that removed income
taxes from the limitations on exemptions in article VII, section 1, for
without a specific provision to this effect,' the legislative power would
be subject to possible doubt. The court might still find the tax to be
a property tax and the mandatory exemptions of article VII to apply.
Some of these amendments'54 have contained provisions for specific
exemptions or deductions which should be included only in the taxing
statutes themselves. Other such restrictive proposals have contained
maximum rates' or limitations on the imposition of other taxes. "'
Such detailed provisions in a constitution may create later problems
under changed circumstances, as have the forty-mill limitation and
the constitutional definition of property.
Another provision"' suggested is a clause stating that ad valorem
tax limitations shall not apply to income taxes. This would probably
exempt an income tax from the forty-mill limitation of section 2 of
article VII, as a logical interpretation of this section is that it applies
only to ad valorem taxes.'58 However, section 1 of article VII probably
applies to all property taxes, and the limitations imposed by that
section might still apply.
Proposals 5' for removing the restrictions of section 1, article VII,
which now prevents a graduated net income tax,' as well as for elimi-
is, See note 119 supra.
152H.J. Res. 17 (1957); 7, Ex. Sess. (1953); 14 and 21 (1953); 9 (1951); 9
(1949) ; 4 (1941) ; S.J. Res. 2 (1955) ; 20 (1953) ; and 15 (1947) provided for exemp-
tions and deductions. H.J. Res. 12 (1939) ; S.J. Res. 2, Ex. Sess. (1951) ; and 3 (1931)
provided only for exemptions.
15 Exemptions of art. VII, § 1, shall not apply. H.J. Res. 10 (1931). The same
effect could be gotten by stating that income taxes are not property taxes.
154 Deductions the same as provided for by the United States income tax laws [H.J.
Res. 2, Ex. Sess. (1955)]. Deductions and exemptions allowed, but the first $1,000.00
and corporate dividends exempt [H.J. Res. 13 (1955]. One thousand dollars per indi-
vidual, $2,000.00 per married couple, and $300.00 per child exempt from income taxa-
tion [H.J. Res. 8 (1939) ; S.J. Res. 10 and 14 (1939)].
155 HJ. Res. 32 (1955) and 2 (1949) had an eight per cent maximum rate, and HJ.
Res. 8 (1939) ; S.J. Res. 10 and 14 (1939) had a three per cent limit on the first
$3,000.00 of income.
156 See note 143 supra.
'15 H.J. Res. 5 (1937) ; S.J. Res. 5 (1937).
158 "[Taxes] upon real and personal property... shall not exceed forty mills on the
assessed valuation... [when levied by the state or] ... any political subdivision...
authorized ... to levy .... ad valorem taxes on property...."
'59 H.J. Res. amended 4 (1941) ; 12 (1939) ; S.J. Res. 20 (1953) ; and 2, 2nd Ex.
Sess. (1951).
160 See note 3 and its textual referent mipra.
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nating the forty-mill limitation, are ones declaring that income is not
property for the purpose of taxation. But there still would be a remote
possibility that the court would find a tax on income from real estate
was not a tax on the income but on the real estate itself, as it did in
the Jensen case.16' To avoid this, it might be necessary to include a
clause that income from any source whatsoever may be taxed and that
such a tax is not a property tax. This provision would also avoid the
taxing restrictions on property.
The best amendment that could be made to avoid constitutional
problems arising from taxation of income would be one that eliminated
most of the constitutional provisions in relation to taxation and merely
contained a grant of power to tax."8 2 Another solution, of course, would
be to eliminate the subject of taxation entirely from the constitu-
tion." 3 This would avoid any of the state constitutional problems in
relation to any tax, other than general constitutional restrictions.
If an amendment is to be made to allow a graduated net income tax
without changing any of the present provisions of the constitution,
the writers suggest one that is short and general, such as the following:
The legislature may impose taxes upon gross or net income, from
whatever source derived, with such rates, graduations, exemptions,
credits, and deductions as the legislature may provide. Such a tax
shall not be a tax upon property, nor shall article VII, sections 1 and 2,
apply.
If desired, other sections, such as article XI, section 9, also could be
made non-applicable.
1,J1 185 Wash. at 222. See textual referent to note 47 s'upra.
162H.J. Res. 35 (1937); 19 (1935); and S.J. Res. 17 (1935), would have had
the legislature tax as would best or most fairly distribute the cost of government,
H.J. Res. 9 (1931) and 10 (1929) provided that taxes should be levied in the manner
provided by law. If these were the only provisions, income taxation would clearly be
allowed. Provision that all taxes may be graduated and progressive or that they may
be graduated and progressive in each class, as was suggested by H.J. Res. 2 and sub-
stitute 2 (1935) and S.J. Res. 7 (1935), would allow graduated income taxation and
would remove all the property tax limitations, except that if the forty-mill limit of
amend. XVII were not also eliminated, how the two provisions would work together
is speculative.
103 CoNx. CoNsT. art. X, § 1, merely grants the legislature all the powers of a legis-
lature of a free people. This has been construed to include the power to tax.
19581
